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Can	the	three	concepts	of	Neutralization Techniques,	Moral Disengagement,	and	Secondary Self-Serving Cognitive Distortions be	conceived	theoretically	and	empir-
ically	as	capturing	the	same	cognitive	processes	and	thus	be	measured	with	one	single	scale	of	Moral Neutralization?	First,	we	show	how	the	different	approaches	
overlap	conceptually.	Second,	in	Study	1,	we	verify	that	four	scales	derived	from	the	three	conceptions	of	Moral Neutralization are	correlated	in	such	a	way	that	they	
can	be	conceived	as	measuring	the	same	phenomenon.	Third,	building	on	the	results	of	Study	1,	we	derive	a	unified	scale	of	Moral Neutralization which	specifically	
focuses	on	the	neutralization	of	aggression	and	test	it	in	a	large	general	population	sample	of	preadolescents	(Study	2).	Confirmatory	factor	analyses	suggest	a	
good	internal	consistency	and	acceptable	cross-gender	factorial	invariance.	Correlation	analyses	with	related	behavioral	and	cognitive	constructs	corroborate	the	
scale’s	criterion	and	convergent	validity.	In	the	final	section	we	present	a	possible	integration	of	Moral Neutralization in	a	broader	framework	of	crime	causation.
Are Moral Disengagement, Neutralization 
Techniques, and Self-Serving Cognitive 
Distortions the Same? Developing a Unified 
Scale of Moral Neutralization of Aggression
Denis	Ribeaud,	Institute	of	Education	Science,	University	of	Zurich,	Switzerland	
Manuel	Eisner,	Institute	of	Criminology,	University	of	Cambridge,	UK
In the past decade the concept of moral disengagement has 
received increased attention, notably in the field of child and 
youth development (Hyde, Shaw, and Moilanen 2010; Hymel, 
Rocke-Henderson, and Bonanno 2005; Paciello et al. 2008). 
In particular, moral disengagement has been examined 
as a possible predictor of aggression and delinquency and 
turns out to be consistently associated with both (Bandura, 
Barbaranelli, and Caprara 1996; Pelton et al. 2004). Along-
side moral disengagement, which was developed relatively 
recently within the framework of social learning theory 
(Bandura, 1986; Bandura et al., 1996), other similar concepts 
were introduced independently in related fields of research. 
Both the criminological theory of neutralization techniques, 
formulated back in 1957 by Sykes and Matza, and the notion 
of self-serving cognitive distortions introduced by Gibbs and 
colleagues (e.g. Barriga and Gibbs, 1996; Gibbs, Potter, and 
Goldstein, 1995) appear to describe cognitive processes that 
are comparable to moral disengagement. These processes 
assist to self-justify acts that are in conflict with a person’s 
moral beliefs and self-concept and are thus key mechanisms 
for understanding aggressive and more generally deviant 
behavior of subjects that view themselves as generally rule-
abiding and complying with common moral standards.
Demonstrating conceptual and empirical convergence 
among concepts developed in related fields of research serves 
to eliminate unnecessary duplication and to reduce com-
plexity by unifying concepts and terminology. The present 
research has three interrelated aims in that direction: First, 
to investigate whether moral disengagement, neutralization 
techniques, and self-serving cognitive distortions conceptu-
ally and empirically capture the same cognitive processes. 
Should this be the case, the second aim is to develop a 
unified measure suited for preadolescents and youth that 
builds on all three concepts and specifically focuses on the 
neutralization of aggression and violence, and to examine 
this measure’s scale reliability and validity. The third aim is 
to explore to what extent the new unified concept – labeled 
moral neutralization – can be integrated into a broader 
framework of crime and violence causation that specifically 
conceives violence as moral action, i.e., Situational Action 
Theory (Wikström and Treiber 2009). 
We begin by describing and comparing the three theoretical 
concepts and examining to what extent they converge con-
ceptually. Then we review four selected scales derived from 
moral disengagement, neutralization techniques, and self-
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serving cognitive distortions and test whether they intersect 
empirically in such a way that they can be regarded as es-
sentially measuring the same. For that purpose we use data 
from a sample of preadolescents surveyed to pilot and refine 
a moral neutralization questionnaire in German (Study 1). 
Next, on the basis of these data, we construct a composite 
scale derived from the four scales. Finally, in Study 2, we 
examine the reliability and validity of the scale developed 
in Study 1 using a large sample of 11-year olds within the 
prospective longitudinal study z-proso (Eisner, Malti, and 
Ribeaud forthcoming; Eisner and Ribeaud 2005). Validity 
tests include correlations with well-established behavioral 
and cognitive outcomes in the domain of aggression and 
antisocial behavior and also with constructs related to core 
propositions of Situational Action Theory (Wikström and 
Treiber 2009).
1.  Conceptual Convergence of Neutralization Techniques, Moral 
Disengagement, and Secondary Self-Serving Biases?
In essence, the three concepts of neutralization techniques, 
moral disengagement, and self-serving cognitive distor-
tions, which are, in the following, generically grouped 
under the term moral neutralization, address the same key 
theoretical question: Through which cognitive processes 
can an individual who is generally rule-abiding and compli-
ant with moral standards minimize cognitive dissonance, 
threats to self-concept, and experiences of moral self-sanc-
tion when he or she transgresses those standards?
The first authors who tried to answer this question were 
two American sociologists, Sykes and Matza (1957). Their 
theoretical effort was driven by their disagreement with 
Cohen’s subculture theory (1955), which understands delin-
quency as a working-class youth reaction to perceived de-
privation. Sykes and Matza’s starting point was the simple 
observation that many delinquents have a middle-class 
background and moral beliefs as well as basic normative 
orientations no different to those of non-delinquents. This 
led them to seek the cognitive processes necessary to over-
come the incongruence between internalized norms and 
beliefs and delinquent behavior. Such processes are viewed 
as preceding a particular delinquent act (Sykes and Matza 
1957, 666) and are therefore conceived as being proximally 
involved in the causation of crime and violence. These 
processes correspond to the five techniques of neutraliza-
tion (Table 1):
Denial of responsibility denotes a technique by which “the 
delinquent can define himself as lacking responsibility for 
his deviant actions” (667), i.e., the delinquent external-
izes the locus of control. For example, a violent interaction 
might be framed as an accident, as provoked by the victim, 
or as the product of peer pressure. 
Through denial of injury perpetrators rationalize the conse-
quences of their acts as not really harmful to the victim. For 
example, the psychological consequences of verbal bullying 
might be discounted.
Denial of the victim occurs when “the delinquent accepts 
the responsibility for his deviant actions and is willing to 
admit that his actions involve injury” (668). Here, the role of 
the victim is redefined, for example conceiving the victim 
as a wrongdoer who deserved a lesson.
Condemnation of the condemners involves shifting atten-
tion from the delinquent act to the motives and behavior of 
those who disapprove such acts (668), for example, portray-
ing authorities as hypocritical or corrupt.
Finally, Sykes and Matza describe the appeal to higher loyal-
ties as follows. “Fifth and last, internal and external social 
controls may be neutralized by sacrificing the demands 
of the larger society for the demands of the smaller social 
groups to which the delinquent belongs such as the sibling 
pair, the gang, or the friendship clique” (669).
More than three decades after the first formulation of a 
moral neutralization framework by Sykes and Matza “no 
less a figure than Albert Bandura … developed an impor-
tant cognitive theory of ‘moral disengagement’”(Maruna 
and Copes 2005, 6). Like Sykes and Matza, Bandura starts 
from the observation that “people do not ordinarily engage 
in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to them-
selves the rightness of their actions” (Bandura et al. 1996, 
365), stressing that mechanisms of moral disengagement 
precede immoral acts, and are thus involved in their im-
mediate causation.
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Comparison of the mechanisms of moral disengagement 
(Bandura et al. 1996) with Sykes and Matza’s categories 
shows a high degree of overlap (Table 1). The first set of dis-
engagement practices labeled cognitive restructuring aims 
to reframe reprehensible conduct as socially acceptable 
behavior. Bandura and colleagues (1996, 365) differentiate 
three mechanisms of restructuration: By “moral justifica-
tion detrimental conduct is made personally and socially 
acceptable by portraying it in the service of valued social or 
moral purposes” (365). This definition obviously encom-
passes the appeal to higher loyalties described by Sykes and 
Matza. The second mechanism, euphemistic language, is 
viewed as a “tool masking reprehensible activities or even 
conferring a respectable status upon them” (365). Although 
Sykes and Matza fail to mention this mechanism explicitly, 
euphemization is implicit in their theory. The many terms 
placed in quotes in their original paper suggest that neu-
tralization is implemented through euphemization.1 The 
third mechanism of cognitive restructuration consists in 
“exploiting advantageous comparisons with more repre-
hensible activities” (365) to neutralize injurious conduct or 
make it to appear of little consequence.2
The second set of disengagement practices encompasses 
techniques that aim to displace or diffuse responsibility for 
reprehensible acts. In perfect congruence with Sykes and 
Matza’s notion of denial of responsibility this implies exter-
nalizing the locus of control for socially sanctioned behav-
ior. Typically, people will “view their actions as springing 
from social pressures or dictates of others” (365) or group 
decision-making will be used as a means to cognitively dif-
fuse personal responsibility. A third set of disengagement 
techniques is aimed at disregarding or distorting the conse-
quences of antisocial behavior. Note the striking congru-
ence with Sykes and Matza’s notion of denial of injury.
The last set of disengagement practices relates to a biased 
perception of the victim. Bandura and colleagues (1996) 
mention two types of victim-related mechanisms of disen-
gagement. Dehumanization of the victim “divests people of 
 Table 1: Overview of concepts of moral neutralization
Cognitive	Mechanism
Neutralization	Techniques	
(Sykes	and	Matza	1957)
Moral	Disengagement	
(Bandura	et	al.	1996)
Secondary	Self-Serving		
Cognitive	Distortions	
(Barriga	and	Gibbs	1996)
Cognitive	restructuration
·	Appeal	to	higher	loyalties	
·		Euphemistic	language	(implied)
·	Moral	justification	
·	Euphemistic	language	
·	Advantageous	comparison
·		Minimizing/mislabeling		
(partially	overlap)
Minimizing	own	agency
·	Denial	of	responsibility ·	Displacement	of	responsibility		
·	Diffusion	of	responsibility
·	Blaming	others	(partially	overlap)
Disregarding/distorting		
negative	impact
·	Denial	of	injury ·	Disregarding	consequences	
·	Distorting	consequences
·	Minimizing/mislabeling
Blaming/dehumanizing		
the	victim
·	Denial	of	the	victim ·	Dehumanization	
·	Attribution	of	blame
·		Minimizing/mislabeling		
(partially	overlap)
·	Blaming	others	(partially	overlap)	
·	Assuming	the	worst	(partially	overlap)
Condemnation	of	condemner ·	Condemnation	of	condemner
Assuming	the	worst ·	Assuming	the	worst
1 E.g., “…deviant acts are ‘accidents’ … 
Vandalism … may be defined … as ‘mis-
chief’ …” (Sykes and Matza 1957, 667).
2 Producing conceptual overlap with the mechanism 
of distorting consequences (see next paragraph).
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human qualities or attributes bestial qualities to them. Once 
dehumanized, they are no longer viewed as persons with 
feelings, hopes, and concerns” (366), while “by attribution 
of blame, people view themselves as faultless victims driven 
to injurious conduct by forcible provocation [by the victim]” 
(366).3 Obviously, these two mechanisms largely coincide 
with the neutralization technique of denial of the victim.
Overall, moral disengagement and neutralization tech-
niques appear to be broadly congruent. The main differ-
ences are the more elaborate concept of moral justification 
compared to the narrower concept of the appeal to higher 
loyalties, the lack of a counterpart to advantageous com-
parisons in neutralization theory, and condemnation of the 
condemners in the moral disengagement framework. 
The third framework of moral neutralization is rooted in 
the concept of cognitive distortions or thinking errors (Ellis 
1962; Beck 1963) and was developed in the context of young 
offender rehabilitation by Gibbs and colleagues (Barriga 
and Gibbs 1996; Barriga et al. 2000; Gibbs et al. 1995). In 
contrast to Ellis’s and Beck’s focus on self-debasing distor-
tions, Gibbs and colleagues are interested in self-serving dis-
tortions. They distinguish between primary and secondary 
distortions: “Primary cognitive distortions are self-centered 
attitudes, thoughts, and beliefs” (Barriga and Gibbs 1996, 
334) and involve “according status to one’s views, expecta-
tions, needs, rights, immediate feelings and desires to such 
a degree that the legitimate views, etc. of others (or even 
one’s own long-term best interest) are scarcely considered 
or are disregarded altogether” (334).4 Secondary distortions 
serve to support the primary distortions and “have been 
characterized as pre- or post-transgression rationalizations 
that serve to ‘neutralize’ conscience or guilt” (334). Like 
neutralization techniques and moral disengagement, Gibbs 
and colleagues conceive cognitive distortions as potentially 
preceding antisocial action. As shown below, their account 
of secondary cognitive distortions (Table 1) shows strong 
similarities with the other two moral neutralization frame-
works.
Blaming others comprises “misattributing blame to outside 
sources, especially: another person, a group, or a momen-
tary aberration (…); or misattributing blame for one’s vic-
timization or other misfortune to innocent others” (Barriga 
and Gibbs 1996, 334). This distortion overlaps with disen-
gagement mechanisms such as diffusion and displacement of 
responsibility and attribution of blame.
The second type of distortion, minimizing/mislabeling, 
consists in “depicting antisocial behavior as causing no real 
harm, or as being acceptable or even admirable; or refer-
ring to others with a belittling or dehumanizing label” 
(334). Obviously, this concept shares much in common with 
Bandura’s notions of moral justification, euphemistic lan-
guage, advantageous comparisons, disregarding or distorting 
consequences, and dehumanization. 
Finally, the notion of assuming the worst, which consists 
in “gratuitously attributing hostile intentions to others, 
considering a worst-case scenario for a social situation as if 
it were inevitable; or assuming that improvement is impos-
sible in one’s own or others’ behavior” (334) partly overlaps 
with Bandura’s concept of attribution of blame, but also 
extends the set of possible neutralization mechanisms.5
Overall, our review shows a high degree of congruence 
among the processes of moral neutralization described in 
the three frameworks of moral disengagement, neutraliza-
tion techniques, and self-serving cognitive distortions, 
thus justifying further enquiry into the empirical overlap 
between measures derived from them (for a further discus-
3 This mechanism consists in externalizing the locus 
of control by locating it in the victim. Accord-
ingly, it represents a special case of displacement of 
responsibility. Note also that Bandura conceives the 
construct of hostile attribution of intent (Crick and 
Dodge 1994) as a possible mechanism of attribution 
of blame (366). The problem of conceiving hostile 
attribution as a mechanism of moral disengagment 
is discussed in the last section of the present paper.
4 Criminologists will notice the striking similar-
ity between the definition of primary cognitive 
distortions and Gottfredson and Hirschi’s concept 
of self-control (1990, 89), and particularly with the 
two constituting dimensions of self-centeredness 
and impulsivity (i.e., a “here and now” orienta-
tion and the inability to defer gratification).
5 The closeness of this notion to hostile attribution 
of intent (Crick and Dodge 1994) is not unprob-
lematic in our view, since it tends to conflate moral 
rationalization with biased information processing.
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sion of theoretical approaches in the field of moral neutral-
ization, see Maruna and Copes 2005).
2.  Measurement Instruments for Neutralization Techniques, Moral 
Disengagement, and Self-Serving Cognitive Distortions
All three moral neutralization frameworks have been em-
pirically tested. Some instruments were designed to measure 
post-hoc neutralization of offences committed by research 
subjects (e.g., Rogers and Buffalo 1974) while others assess en-
dorsement of neutralizations for selected scenarios of antiso-
cial behavior (e.g., Ball 1966). Most instruments in this field, 
however, consist of conventional item batteries designed to 
capture different mechanisms of moral neutralization using 
Likert scales. Such instruments have the advantage that 
they are not limited to post-hoc justifications and thus allow 
offenders to be compared with non-offenders and measure-
ments to be used to predict later offending. Given appropri-
ate wording, these instruments are easier to understand than 
a scenario-based approach (e.g., Shields and Whitehall 1994) 
which is an important issue in studies with children.
The preselection of scales for the z-proso study was guided 
by three requirements. First, the scales of interest had to be 
related to one of the three moral neutralization frameworks 
presented above. Second, they should measure neutraliza-
tion of aggressive behavior. Third, they needed to be suited 
for a preadolescent sample, and later a youth sample. Four 
scales were selected using these criteria: techniques of neu-
tralization of violence were measured with a brief instru-
ment used for all age groups in the Denver Youth Study (i.e., 
from age 7 to at least age 20) (Huizinga et al. 2003). In the 
following, this scale is referred to as NT1. Moral disengage-
ment was assessed with two scales: Scale MD1 is the origi-
nal 32-item scale designed by Bandura and colleagues (1996, 
374) and first used in a general population sample of 10- to 
15-year-old Italian adolescent (M=11.8) of which an abbrevi-
ated version was used by Pelton and colleagues (2004) in an 
African-American community sample aged between 9 and 
14 years (M=11.4). Both versions suggest a one-dimensional 
factor structure of moral disengagement, i.e., the mecha-
nisms of moral disengagement tend to come together in the 
same persons (Bandura et al. 1996, 367; Pelton et al. 2004, 
36), and accordingly both yield high internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α=.82). The second moral disengagement 
measure (MD2) specifically examines moral disengage-
ment related to school bullying (Hymel, Rocke-Henderson, 
and Bonanno 2005) and was tested in a Canadian upper 
and middle class sample of 8th-, 9th-, and 10th-graders. 
Out of 51 items, 13 were identified as indicators of the four 
main mechanisms of moral disengagement (Table 1, col-
umn 1, rows 1–4). Factor analysis showed a single factor of 
moral disengagement, again suggesting that the different 
mechanisms of moral disengagement tend to converge. The 
resulting scale yielded a Cronbach’s α of .81. Self-serving 
cognitive distortions were measured with an adapted 
version of the “How I think” questionnaire (HIT). Unlike 
the original questionnaire by Gibbs and colleagues (2001), 
which also encompasses non-violent problem behavior, the 
adapted Dutch version (van der Velden 2008) specifically 
focuses on aggression and bullying among children and 
adolescents of both genders (M=11.4 years). Whereas van 
der Velden (2008) does not report pertinent analyses, two 
studies (one American by Barriga and Gibbs 1996, 339; the 
other Dutch by Nas, Brugman, and Koops 2008, 186) that 
use the original HIT scale in mixed samples of incarcerated 
and general population male youth (16<M<17 years) report 
strong correlations among the three secondary self-serving 
cognitive distortions (between .71 and .78), again suggesting 
a one-dimensional latent construct of moral neutralization.
Generally, measures of moral neutralization correlate with 
aggressive and delinquent behavior. For example, a study 
using a neutralization techniques scale similar to the one 
used in the Denver study reports correlations of r=.40** and 
r=.41**6 between neutralization techniques and violence in 
the American National Youth Survey (Agnew 1994, 580). 
Bandura and colleagues (1996, 369) report correlations 
between .13***7 and .56*** between moral disengagement 
and aggression, and .20* and .45*** for delinquency. Pelton 
and colleagues (2004, 36) report similar patterns in their 
6 ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; n.s.p>.05; n.a.not available
7 The correlation of r=.06*** reported for 
teacher-rated aggression in Table 1 is erroneous 
and should read .13*** (personal communica-
tion from Claudio Barbarenelli, 2 July 2010).
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sample while Hymel and colleagues (2005, 38) report a 
highly significant association between bullying and moral 
disengagement (F(2, 459)=69.57***). Regarding secondary 
self-serving cognitive distortions, Barriga and Gibbs (1996, 
339) report correlations between .23** and .38*** with the 
Nye Short Self-Report Delinquency Questionnaire and 
between .43*** and .55*** with the Externalizing Scale of the 
Youth Self-Report. Similarly, Nas and colleagues (2008, 186) 
report coefficients between .20* and .29** for correlations 
among self-serving cognitive distortions and the Teacher 
Report Form and of .20n.a. and .37n.a. between self-serving 
cognitive distortions and the Reactive-Proactive Aggression 
Questionnaire. 
3. Study 1: Empirical Overlap and Composite Measure
Study 1 set out to explore the empirical overlap of the dif-
ferent measures of moral neutralization of aggression and 
violence and, if possible, to derive a composite measure 
based on the best-fitting items of the different scales.
3.1. Participants and Data Collection
The 142 participants were recruited in seven 4th- and 
5th- grade classes in middle-class suburbs near the city of 
Zurich. Parental consent was obtained for all participants 
in advance. All contacted parents and children consented 
to participate. The mean age of the participants was 
M=10.5 years (SD=0.68), 52.5 percent were male. The surveys 
were conducted during regular school hours. Participants 
were guided through the written questionnaire by two 
researchers. All questionnaires were completed within 
45 minutes.
3.2. Measures
First, the 67 items of the four scales of interest (NT1, MD1, 
MD2, HIT) were screened and preselected for the goals 
of the study. The items retained for Study 1 are shown in 
Table 2. Ten items of the MD1 scale were eliminated: As 
suggested by Pelton and colleagues (2004), the four eu-
phemistic language items were removed because they are 
inappropriate for children. The other items were removed 
either because they related to behavioral domains other 
than violence and aggression or because they turned out to 
(almost) duplicate items in other scales.8 Three items were 
removed from the MD2 scale because of inverse wording or 
translation problems. 
The HIT scale used for the present study is a Dutch adapta-
tion of the original scale that focuses on aggression and 
verbal bullying (van der Velden 2008). From this 28-item 
scale we discarded items related to primary self-serving 
cognitive distortions and social desirability as well as five 
filler items. Two items in the blaming others subscale were 
removed because they presumably measure hostile attribu-
tion of intent (Crick and Dodge 1994).9 Three other items 
were removed because they strongly overlapped with items 
from other scales or because of translation problems. 
Finally, one item in the NT1 scale was deleted because it 
overlapped with another.
The 31 items retained from preselection were translated into 
German (see Table 2 for the English wordings) and used in a 
paper-and-pencil questionnaire in the Study 1 sample.
3.3. Analysis
Correlational and exploratory factor analyses (EFA) were 
used.10 First, all items of a given scale were forced to load on 
one single factor (Table 2, column 7). To improve the mea-
surement quality of the scale, items with standardized load-
ings above .4 were selected and their standardized scores 
were averaged.11 Then the four scales were correlated with 
each other and factor analyzed to test the empirical overlap 
8 This implies that the correlations between the 
scales reported below would likely have been stron-
ger if overlapping items had been retained. Hence, 
the coefficients presented in the following can be 
viewed as conservative estimates of the correlations 
that would have resulted between the full-length 
original scales. 
9 E.g., “People are always trying to start fights with 
me.” Some authors even explicitly use these items 
as indicators of hostile attribution bias (Pornari and 
Woods 2010). 
10 Although confirmatory factor analyses would 
have been the method of choice, preliminary tests 
suggested that both the overall sample size and the 
ratio of the number of parameter estimates to the 
number of cases were too small to allow proper pa-
rameter estimation (see e.g., Bentler and Chou 1987; 
Hair et al. 2006; Jackson 2003). 
11 The criterion of .4 is somewhat stricter 
than the one of .3 typically recommended 
(Bryant and Yarnold 1995) to reduce the 
number of items for the final scale.
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(Table 3). Finally, all preselected indicators of the four scales 
were forced to load on a single factor (Table 2, column 8). 
Only items with a loading above .4 were selected for the 
final integrated moral neutralization scale used in Study 2.
To prevent case deletions in the factor analyses and in the 
computation of the sum scores all missing values in the 
items were imputed using the EM imputation algorithm 
(SPSS 2009). The number of missing cases varied between 0 
and 14 per indicator (Table 2).
3.4. Results
First, we examine the properties of each individual scale. 
The first factor extracted from the ten MD1 items accounts 
for 21.2 percent of total variance (eigenvalue 2.12). With 
eigenvalues of 1.54, and 1.17 respectively, the next two fac-
tors also account for a substantial share of the total vari-
ance. However, the loading structure in the three-factor 
solution (not shown) does not suggest meaningful factors. 
Since all items in the one-factor solution load positively and 
significantly on the single factor, the hypothesis of one-
dimensionality is supported by the data. However, only four 
items meet the strict criterion of a loading above .4 (Table 
2, Item ID 1–4) and were kept for scale construction. The 
resulting scale yields an internal consistency of Cronbach’s 
α=.61 (Table 3).
Factor analysis of the ten MD2 items shows a clearer scree 
pattern (Cattell and Vogelmann 1977). The first factor ac-
counts for 32.1 percent of the variance, the corresponding 
eigenvalue of 3.21 being much higher than the eigenvalue 
of the next two factors (1.18, 1.04). Moreover, all items of 
the scale load with at least .4 on the single-factor solution, 
thus clearly suggesting monodimensionality. The resulting 
scale yields a Cronbach’s α of .76. Similarly, the first factor 
extracted from the HIT items accounts for 32.7 percent of 
total variance, and the corresponding eigenvalue of 2.62 is 
again much higher than the eigenvalue of the next two fac-
tors (1.12, 1.02), again evidencing a clear scree pattern. All 
items of this scale also load positively on the single-factor 
solution. One item had a loading below .4 (ID 28) and was 
consequently excluded. The derived 7-item scale yields 
a reliability of .71. Finally, the first factor extracted from 
the three NT1 items explains 51.4 percent of the variance 
(eigenvalue 1.54) while the other two factors have eigenval-
ues below 1 (0.85, 0.61). All three items load with at least .6 
on the first factor. The derived scale yields a Cronbach’s α 
of .52.
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Table 2: Item wordings, descriptive statistics, and factor loadings in Study 1
Item	wording Generic	domain Scale N M S.D.
Single-factor	
loading	on	
original	scale
Single-factor	
loading	of	
selected	
items	on	
total	scale
Item	
ID	
It	is	alright	to	fight	to	protect	your	friends. Cog.	Restruct. MD1 138 2.51 1.03 .742 .578 1
It	is	alright	to	fight	when	your	group’s	honour	is	threatened. Cog.	Restruct. MD1 128 1.75 0.91 .724 .630 2
If	someone	acts	like	a	jerk,	it	is	ok	to	treat	them	badly. Victim MD1 141 1.52 0.75 .663 .612 3
It	is	unfair	to	blame	a	child	who	had	only	a	small	part	in	the	harm	caused	by	a	group. Minim.	Agency MD1 136 2.93 1.29 .410 .137 4
A	kid	who	only	suggests	breaking	rules	should	not	be	blamed	if	other	kids	go	ahead	and	do	it. Minim.	Agency MD1 137 1.88 1.03 .350 --  5
If	a	group	decides	together	to	do	something	harmful	it	is	unfair	to	blame	any	kid	in	the	group	for	it. Minim.	Agency MD1 140 3.07 1.28 .332 --  6
Insults	among	children	do	not	hurt	anyone. Neg.	Impact MD1 137 1.55 0.85 .254 --  7
Teasing	someone	does	not	really	hurt	them. Neg.	Impact MD1 137 1.54 0.87 .234 --  8
A	kid	in	a	gang	should	not	be	blamed	for	the	trouble	the	gang	causes. Minim.	Agency MD1 135 2.84 1.14 .230 --  9
Children	do	not	mind	being	teased	because	it	shows	interest	in	them. Neg.	Impact MD1 135 1.54 0.84 .170 --  10
Bullying	can	be	a	good	way	to	solve	problems. Neg.	Impact MD2 142 1.34 0.68 .702 .574 11
It’s	okay	to	join	in	when	someone	you	don’t	like	is	being	bullied. Cog.	Restruct. MD2 138 1.51 0.78 .656 .599 12
Sometimes	it’s	okay	to	bully	other	people. Cog.	Restruct. MD2 141 1.74 0.88 .649 .622 13
Some	kids	get	bullied	because	they	deserve	it. Victim MD2 136 1.92 1.02 .634 .570 14
Bullying	is	just	a	normal	part	of	being	a	kid. Cog.	Restruct. MD2 137 1.89 0.86 .556 .471 15
Some	kids	need	to	be	picked	on	just	to	teach	them	a	lesson. Neg.	Impact MD2 139 1.65 0.83 .550 .564 16
In	my	group	of	friends,	bullying	is	okay. Cog.	Restruct. MD2 140 1.34 0.59 .483 .471 17
It’s	okay	to	pick	on	losers. Victim MD2 142 1.18 0.53 .482 .294 18
Most	students	who	get	bullied	bring	it	on	themselves.	 Victim MD2 138 2.02 0.86 .475 .458 19
Getting	bullied	helps	to	make	people	tougher. Neg.	Impact MD2 140 1.81 1.05 .402 .427 20
You	should	hurt	people	first,	before	they	hurt	you. Assuming	Worst HIT 138 1.58 0.93 .720 .686 21
People	sometimes	need	to	be	bashed. Cog.	Restruct. HIT 139 1.65 0.93 .706 .663 22
Sometimes	you	have	to	hurt	people	if	you	have	a	problem	with	them. Minim.	Agency HIT 141 1.73 0.82 .667 .605 23
Only	a	coward	would	ever	walk	away	from	a	fight. Cog.	Restruct. HIT 139 1.91 1.08 .662 .592 24
It’s	ok	to	slag	other	people	off,	they	slag	you	off	too. Assuming	Worst HIT 141 1.72 0.87 .574 .568 25
It’s	ok	to	slag	other	people	off.	It	doesn’t	really	hurt	anybody. Cog.	Restruct. HIT 142 1.38 0.72 .464 .388 26
If	people	don’t	cooperate	with	me,	it’s	not	my	fault	if	someone	gets	hurt. Minim.	Agency HIT 131 2.05 1.17 .404 .381 27
If	you	don’t	push	people	around,	you	will	always	get	picked	on. Assuming	Worst HIT 136 1.71 0.84 .111 --  28
It’s	ok	to	get	in	a	physical	fight	with	someone	if	you	have	to	stand	up	to	protect	your	rights. Cog.	Restruct. NT 137 1.82 0.94 .803 .668 29
It’s	ok	to	get	in	a	physical	fight	with	someone	if	they	hit	you	first. Minim.	Agency NT 137 2.08 1.04 .711 .508 30
It’s	ok	to	hurt	someone	if	you	didn’t	mean	to	or	it	was	an	accident. Minim.	Agency NT 139 2.12 1.01 .627 .418 31
Note:	Standardized	factor	loadings	below	.4	are	shaded	in	grey.	Item	IDs	of	items	omitted	from	the	final	scale	are	also	shaded	in	grey.
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Table 3:  Correlations between different scales of 
moral neutralization (Study 1)
  Correlations        
  1 2 3
Factor	
loading
M S.D. Alpha
1	MD1 .79 0.00 0.68 .61
2	MD2 .51 .84 0.00 0.56 .76
3	HIT .56 .77 .90 0.00 0.60 .71
4	NT1 .59 .53 .64 .82 0.00 0.72 .52
As Table 3 shows, the four mean scales derived from the 
MD1, MD2, HIT, and NT scales are strongly correlated with 
each other (.51***≤r≤.77***). Accordingly, factorial analysis 
of these mean scales suggests a one-factor solution, the first 
factor explaining 70.1 percent of the variance  (eigenvalue 
2.8) while the other three factors have eigenvalues below 
0.6. Similarly, when all items constituting the four moral 
neutralization scales are factor-analyzed together (Table 2), 
a clear scree pattern emerges suggesting a one-dimensional 
factor structure. The first factor accounts for 23.2 percent 
of the total variance (eigenvalue 7.19) while all other factors 
have eigenvalues of 2.0 and below. All items load signifi-
cantly on the first factor. Overall, these results strongly sup-
port the hypothesis that neutralization techniques, moral 
disengagement, and secondary self-serving cognitive distor-
tions converge not only theoretically but also empirically.
For the final version of the instrument the number of items 
was reduced yet again,12 and the item wordings were refined, 
unified, and simplified to better meet the needs of the 
study population. The resulting 18-item moral neutraliza-
tion instrument was tested in a second pretest sample of 
118 fourth- and fifth-graders (mean age M=11.4 (SD=0.48); 
50.0 percent male). As a result of this analysis, one item 
with a loading below .4 was removed from the scale (ID 31). 
After this, only one item reflecting agency minimization 
remained in the scale (ID 30). This item was also omitted 
to further shorten and simplify the scale. The final 16-item 
version of the scale yields an excellent consistency of α=.87 
(first pretest sample) and α=.88 (second pretest sample).
4. Study 2: Testing the Composite Scale
Study 2 assessed the internal consistency, cross-gender 
structural invariance, and criterion validity of the moral 
neutralization scale developed in Study 1 in a large sample 
of preadolescents and also includes correlational analyses 
with two constructs relevant to Situational Action Theory 
(Wikström and Treiber 2009) to explore possible integra-
tion of the moral neutralization concept within this broader 
criminological framework.
4.1. Participants and Data Collection
Data for this study were collected as part of z-proso, a large-
scale prospective longitudinal study (Eisner and Ribeaud 
2005). Participants were recruited from a stratified random 
sample of 56 public primary schools in the city of Zurich 
when they entered grade 1 in 2004. Initial recruitment 
involved letters to the parents in their native language (nine 
languages) followed by telephone appointments for personal 
interviews, again in the parents’ native language. Parental 
consent for the child’s participation was obtained at the 
beginning of the parent interview at the parent’s home, as 
a part of the informed consent procedure (for details on 
sampling and recruitment see Eisner et al. 2009; Eisner and 
Ribeaud 2005; Eisner and Ribeaud 2007).13 At the time of 
the fourth data collection wave used for the present study, 
a valid set of moral neutralization data was available for 
1,109 participants. This corresponds to a participation rate 
of 66.2 percent of the gross sample and a retention rate of 
81.5 percent of the wave 1 sample.14 At wave 4, participants 
were aged M=11.33 on average (SD=0.37), 50.9 percent were 
male, 44.4 percent were from migrant families (both par-
ents born abroad). Of the participants 87.5 percent were in 
fifth grade, 10.3 percent in fourth grade, and 2.2 percent in 
12 Four items with loadings below .4 on the total 
scale were removed (ID 4, 18, 26, 27). One item was 
deleted because of its difficult (German) wording (ID 
23) and another because it could potentially reflect 
facts rather than rationalizations (ID 17). 
13 Parental consent for child participation was 
also obtained for an additional 8.6 percent 
of the raw sample from parents who refused 
to participate themselves. Overall, the child 
participation rate at wave 1 was 82.6 percent.
14 The considerable drop in participation between 
wave 1 and 4 is a consequence of the legal necessity to 
renew parental consent for all participants at wave 4. 
At this time, many parents refused  continuing 
participation of their children in the study.
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another grade, in special education without specified grade, 
or respective data were missing. Overall, 3.1 percent of the 
children attended a special education class. 
The surveys were conducted during regular school hours in 
classrooms of public schools. Participants at a given school 
were pooled across classes to form groups of 5 to 20 children. 
Participating children were guided through the written 
questionnaire by two or three researchers. The surveys lasted 
90 minutes. The 13.8 percent of the children who had moved 
out of the city or who were the only project participant in 
their school were surveyed individually at their home.
Selected behavioral outcomes were also measured at the 
parent and teacher levels. Among the 1,109 cases with a 
 valid moral neutralization measure, there were 994 cases 
with a completed parent questionnaire and 1,009 with 
a completed teacher questionnaire. Parents, usually the 
mothers, were surveyed at home with standardized com-
puter-assisted face-to-face interviews which lasted about an 
hour. Participants were offered an incentive worth approxi-
mately €25 per interview. Since 57 percent of the parents in 
the gross sample belonged to migrant communities, inter-
views were also conducted in the most important minority 
languages (Albanian, English, Italian, Portuguese, Serbian/
Croatian/Bosnian, Spanish, Tamil, and Turkish). Details of 
the multilingual survey procedure are described in Eisner 
and Ribeaud (2007). Teacher assessments consisted of one-
page paper-and-pencil questionnaires that included ques-
tions on the child’s  behavior, on the child’s social role in the 
class, and his/her academic achievement.
4.2. Measures
Moral neutralization was measured with the 16-item scale 
developed in Study 1. Eight items refer to mechanisms 
involving cognitive restructuring, three are related to dis-
tortion/disregard of negative consequences, three relate to 
blaming the victim, and two involve assuming the worst. As 
to behavioral domains, eight items relate to bullying and 
verbal aggression, five relate to physical aggression, and two 
relate to aggression in general. 
Only questionnaires with a valid entry for at least 10 of the 
16 items were retained for further analysis. The 59 cases 
with one to six missing values were imputed using the EM 
algorithm (SPSS 2009). Scale properties are presented in the 
results section.
A first set of behavioral outcomes used to assess the criterion 
validity of the moral neutralization instrument was mea-
sured with the Social Behavior Questionnaire developed by 
Tremblay and colleagues (1991). The Social Behavior Ques-
tionnaire is similar to the Child Behavior Checklist (Achen-
bach and Ruffle 2000) and is adapted from the Preschool 
Behavior Questionnaire (Behar and Stringfield 1974) and the 
Prosocial Behavior Questionnaire (Weir and Duveen 1981). 
For the present study we used an age-adapted written ver-
sion for the child survey while parents were administered 
the face-to-face adult version and teachers completed an ab-
breviated written version (for more details see Ribeaud and 
Eisner 2010). All versions are based on 5-point Likert scales. 
The prosociality subscale elicits altruistic and empathic 
behavior (child version (C): 8 items, Cronbach’s α=.79; par-
ent version (P): 10 items, α=.83; teacher version (T): 7 items, 
α=.92). Moreover, the Social Behavior Questionnaire also 
differentiates between two basic types of aggression, namely, 
indirect/covert aggression (C: 3, α=.76; P: 5, α=.82; T: n.a.) and 
direct/overt aggression (C: 9, α=.76; P: 12, α=.82; T: 11, α=.93).
Further behavioral outcomes include a bullying scale 
covering four types of bullying (verbal, physical, exclusion, 
hiding/destroying property) measured at the child level (4, 
α=.75) and three indices of delinquency and serious problem 
behavior encompassing truancy, substance use (alcohol, 
tobacco, cannabis), theft, vandalism, carrying a weapon, 
and assault (C: 11, α=.67; P: 9, α=.37; T: 8, α=.48).
Two indicators are related to social skills. To assess aggres-
sive conflict resolution schemata participants were asked 
what they usually do in a conflict with other children. 
Answers were recorded on 5-point Likert scales (4 items, 
α=.70). Within the same instrument we also assessed so-
cially competent conflict resolution schemata (4 items, α=.65). 
Finally, two indicators related to cognitive predispositions 
were included because of their specific relevance to Situ-
ational Action Theory (Wikström and Treiber 2009). Low 
self-control was assessed using a scale derived from Gras-
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mick and colleagues (1993), with two items for each of the 
five domains of risk-seeking, impulsivity, self-centeredness, 
preference for physical activities, and low frustration toler-
ance (10 items, α=.74). Intrinsic benefits and discounting of 
moral costs of offending were measured with a scenario-
based instrument assessing decision-making . Participants 
were presented three scenarios depicting the following 
situations: reacting violently to a provocation, threatening a 
schoolmate to get his mobile phone, and shoplifting chew-
ing gum. For each situation respondents answered ques-
tions about the perceived internal and external (i.e., social) 
costs and benefits. The intrinsic benefits of offending were 
assessed by asking how good the respondents would feel in 
the depicted situation, with high values corresponding to 
feeling very good. Discounting of moral costs was assessed 
by asking respondents how bad they would find it to act as 
depicted, with low values indicating feeling very bad about 
offending. All responses were recorded on 4-point Likert 
scales (6 items, α=.73).
4.3. Analysis
The internal consistency of the moral neutralization measure 
developed in Study 1 was assessed with confirmatory factor 
analysis and the invariance of the factor structure tested 
across gender groups with AMOS 6.0 software (Arbuckle, 
2005). Then convergent and divergent validity of the derived 
moral neutralization scale was assessed using Pearson cor-
relations with selected behavioral and cognitive constructs.
4.4. Results
4.4.1. Internal Consistency
The moral neutralization construct’s internal consistency was 
assessed in a one-factor structure in which all 16 items of the 
scale were forced to load on a single factor. This initial solution 
yields a near-acceptable fit of CFI=.926, RMSEA=.055 (χ2=452.1; 
df=104; N=1109; p<.001). Modification indices suggested that 
freeing-up six covariances among error terms could signifi-
cantly improve model fit (χ2=194.0; df=6).15 This increases the 
fit indices of the adapted model to CFI=.966, RMSEA=.038. 
15 The six covariances relate to items with 
identical keywords and/or similar meaning.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics and standardized loadings on the Moral Neutralization factor (N=1209)
Standardized	factor	loadings
Itema Item	wordingb Domain M S.D. All Boys Girls
1 It	is	alright	to	fight	to	protect	your	friends. Cog.	Restruct. 2.23 0.99 .48 .44 .53
2 It	is	alright	to	beat	somebody	who	doesn’t	respect	your	friends. Cog.	Restruct. 1.40 0.68 .69 .71 .57
12 It’s	okay	to	join	in	when	someone	you	don’t	like	is	being	bullied. Cog.	Restruct. 1.47 0.71 .56 .57 .49
13 Sometimes	it’s	okay	to	bully	other	people. Cog.	Restruct. 1.56 0.75 .61 .63 .61
15 Bullying	is	just	a	normal	part	of	being	a	kid. Cog.	Restruct. 1.91 0.92 .45 .45 .46
22 People	sometimes	need	to	be	bashed. Cog.	Restruct. 1.56 0.84 .65 .68 .50
24 Only	a	coward	would	ever	walk	away	from	a	fight. Cog.	Restruct. 1.80 1.04 .51 .51 .42
29 It’s	ok	to	get	in	a	physical	fight	with	someone	if	you	have	to	stand	up	to	protect	your	rights. Cog.	Restruct. 1.67 0.85 .60 .62 .47
11 Many	problems	can	be	solved	with	violence. Neg.	Impact 1.27 0.66 .46 .48 .31
16 Some	kids	need	to	be	picked	on	just	to	teach	them	a	lesson. Neg.	Impact 1.50 0.77 .68 .70 .63
20 Getting	bullied	helps	to	make	people	tougher. Neg.	Impact 1.77 0.89 .38 .39 .37
3 If	someone	acts	like	a	jerk,	it	is	ok	to	treat	them	badly. Victim 1.50 0.69 .67 .69 .60
14 Some	kids	get	bullied	because	they	deserve	it. Victim 1.85 0.91 .58 .59 .54
19 Most	students	who	get	bullied	bring	it	on	themselves. Victim 2.14 0.90 .38 .38 .35
21 You	should	hurt	people	first,	before	they	hurt	you. Assum.	Worst 1.51 0.81 .60 .62 .47
25 It’s	ok	to	slag	other	people	off,	they	slag	you	off	too. Assum.	Worst 1.79 0.90 .53 .53 .54
a	see	Table	2;	b	wordings	may	slightly	differ	from	those	in	Study	1	due	to	refinements.
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Table 5: Tests of factorial invariance across gender groups
Model CFI RMSEA χ2 df	 χ2/df Diff.	in	χ2	 Diff.	in	DF p
Unconstrained	across	groups .966 .026 343.4 196 1.75  
Equal	(unstandardized)	loadings .942 .033 462.9 212 2.18 119.5 16 <.001
Equal	loadings	and	equal	error	terms .900 .041 663.4 228 2.91 320.0 32 <.001
Equal	loadings,	equal	error	terms	and	equal	error	covariances .896 .042 688.4 234 2.94 345.0 38 <.001
As shown in Table 4, the standardized loadings range be-
tween .38 and .67 in the full sample. Both the level of model 
fit and the loading structure confirm one-dimensionality. 
Overall, the 16-item scale of moral neutralization (M=1.78, 
SD=0.49) used for further analysis yields a consistency coeffi-
cient of α=.87. Tests of structural invariance (Table 5) provide 
limited confirmation of invariance across genders. Although 
standardized factor loadings are within similar ranges for 
boys (.38 to .71, see Table 4) and girls (.31 to .63), constraining 
the factor loadings to equality across genders yields a highly 
significant decrease in model fit (χ2=119.5; df=16; see Table 
5). The decrease is further exacerbated when error terms 
(χ2=320.0; df=32) and error covariances (χ2=345.0; df=38) are 
also constrained to equality. However, the less strict tests of 
model fit based on fit indices suggest that constraining factor 
loadings to equality is acceptable (CFI=.942; RMSEA=.033; 
see Table 5), while imposing further restrictions (equal error 
terms, equal error covariances) results in poor CFI values.
16 ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; nsp>.05
4.4.2. Criterion Validity
Table 6 displays the correlations between the moral neutral-
ization scale and selected constructs for the entire sample 
and for both genders separately. The first row shows a 
marked correlation with gender (r=-.25***16), moral neu-
tralization being more prevalent among boys than among 
girls. With one exception, all correlations with behavioral 
outcomes are highly significantly correlated in the ex-
pected direction in the entire sample. While prosociality 
is consistently and significantly negatively correlated with 
moral neutralization across informants (child measure 
(C): r=-.27***; parent (P): r=-.10***; teacher (T): r=-.15***), 
both direct (C: r=.59***; P: r=.10**; T: r=.27***) and indirect 
aggression (C: r=.46***; P: r=.04ns; T: n.a.) are significantly 
positively associated with moral neutralization (except 
parent-reported indirect aggression). Moreover, self-
reported bullying (r=.42***) and delinquency and problem 
behavior as reported by all three informant groups are also 
highly significantly correlated with moral neutralization 
(C: r=.31***; P: r=.11**; T: r=.21***). The children’s behavioral 
self-ratings correlate much better with (self-rated) moral 
neutralization than the teachers’ and the parents’ ratings. 
The scale’s specific focus on aggressive outcomes is reflected 
in stronger correlations with the aggression and bullying 
scales compared – for a specific type of informant – to gen-
eral delinquency/problem behavior. 
These results corroborate the predictive validity of the 
moral neutralization scales in the domain of aggressive 
and, more generally, antisocial behavior, the latter as a 
consequence of the strong association between aggressive 
outcomes and other forms of deviance (not shown).
Construct validity is also corroborated by the positive cor-
relations of moral neutralization with aggressive conflict 
resolution schemata (r=.55***) and by the less pronounced 
negative correlation with competent conflict resolution 
schemata (r=-.22***). Finally, low self-control is strongly 
correlated with moral neutralization (r=.51***). Also, a 
favorable perception of the costs and benefits of offending 
is similarly highly correlated with moral neutralization 
(r=.48***) which likely reflects that moral neutralization 
affects the cost-benefit assessment of offending.
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Table 6: Correlations of moral neutralization with selected constructs
  All Boys Girls
Gender	(1=male;	2=female) -.248*** -- --
Prosociality	(child) -.269*** -.243*** -.156***
Prosociality	(parent) -.100*** -.106* .029
Prosociality	(teacher) -.149*** -.135** -.005
Direct/overt	aggression	(child) .585*** .603*** .465***
Direct/overt	aggression	(parent) .097** .075 .049
Direct/overt	aggression	(teacher) .268*** .264*** .162***
Indirect/covert	aggression	(child) .457*** .459*** .411***
Indirect/covert	aggression	
(parent)
.038 .088* .029
Bullying	(child) .417*** .382*** .380***
Delinquency	and	problem	
	behavior	(child)
.314*** .290*** .239***
Delinquency	and	problem	
	behavior	(parent)
.108*** .105* .022
Delinquency	and	problem	
	behavior	(teacher)
.209*** .190*** .175***
Aggressive	conflict	resolution	
strategies	(child)
-.550*** -.557*** -.440***
Competent	conflict	resolution	
strategies	(child)
-.223*** -.221*** -.187***
Low	self-control	(child) .514*** .524*** .453***
Intrinsic	benefits	and	discounting	
of	moral	costs	(child)
.475*** .475*** .357***
994≤N≤1109 505≤n≤564 483≤n≤545
***p<.001;	**p<.01;	*p<.05
5. Discussion and Conclusions
Our research confirms that the three concepts of Neutral-
ization Techniques (Sykes and Matza 1957), Moral Disen-
gagement (Bandura et al. 1996), and secondary Self-Serving 
Cognitive Distortions (Barriga and Gibbs 1996) essentially 
capture the same cognitive processes. A conceptual review 
broadly supports the convergence hypothesis by demon-
strating that the three approaches identify (under different 
labels) cognitive restructuration, minimizing own agency, 
disregarding/distorting negative impact, and blaming/dehu-
manizing the victim as the four key mechanisms forming a 
cluster of cognitive processes serving to cognitively over-
come dissonance between individual moral standards and 
behavioral transgressions.17 This set of processes, labeled 
moral neutralization in the present study, is important for 
individuals to maintain their moral self-concept without 
experiencing moral self-sanctions, and thus allowing trans-
gressions of moral norms at reduced psychological costs. 
Importantly, all three approaches identify these processes 
as preceding specific antisocial actions and thus conceive 
moral neutralization as facilitating such actions. So all three 
approaches conceive moral neutralization as a factor in the 
(proximal) causation of antisocial action. 
Factor analyses of 31 items derived from a selection of 
moral neutralization measures tested in a small-scale study 
(Study 1) corroborate empirical convergence of the different 
formulations of moral neutralization and confirm the find-
ing from previous research (e.g., Bandura et al. 1996) that 
the key mechanisms of moral neutralization tend to appear 
together in the same persons.
Gender-specific results show that the correlations found 
for the entire sample can, by and large, be reproduced in 
both genders, so it would not appear that moral neutraliza-
tion mediates gender-effects. These results also suggest that 
moral neutralization is similarly correlated with behavioral 
and cognitive outcomes in girls and in boys, providing 
further corroboration of the construct validity of the moral 
neutralization scale.
17 The self-serving cognitive distortions ap-
proach additionally identifies the mechanism 
of assuming the worst which is partly related 
to attribution of blame but is more general in 
assuming negative outcomes as legitimation 
for the transgression of moral rules.
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The 16-item scale of moral neutralization focusing on neu-
tralization of aggression and bullying constructed in Study 
1 was found to be internally consistent, invariant across 
genders and valid when tested in a large sample of 11-year 
olds (Study 2). Confirming previous research we found 
a higher prevalence of moral neutralization among boys 
(Bandura et al. 1996; van der Velden 2008) and marked 
positive correlations with aggressive, violent, and delin-
quent behavior (Agnew 1994; Bandura 1996; Barriga and 
Gibbs 1996; Hymel et al. 2005; Nas et al. 2008; Pelton et al. 
2004). Conversely, moral neutralization was confirmed to 
be negatively correlated with prosocial behavior (Bandura 
et al. 1996). These correlations remained fairly stable across 
genders, suggesting that the scale has the same predictive 
power in both gender groups. Concerning the sources of 
information about behavioral outcomes, the children’s 
self-ratings were much better correlated with (self-assessed) 
moral neutralization than the teachers’ and parents’ rat-
ings. This finding is in line with validation studies of moral 
disengagement which also find higher correlations for the 
children’s self-assessments (Bandura et al. 1996, 369; Pelton 
et al. 2004, 36). The scale’s criterion validity was further 
corroborated by its marked correlation with conflict 
resolution strategies, which is also found for each gender 
separately and which confirms earlier findings on a link-
age between moral disengagement and social competence 
(Pelton et al. 2004, 36).
5.1. Theoretical Outlook
Our conceptual and empirical analyses suggest that moral 
disengagement, neutralization techniques, and (secondary) 
self-serving cognitive distortions describe the very same 
cognitive processes and that these processes tend to cluster 
within the same persons. For the sake of scientific parsimo-
ny it seems justified to subsume these processes under the 
single label of moral neutralization and to derive a single 
scale informed by all the original conceptualizations. 
From this unifying point, theoretical criminology needs 
to integrate the concept into a broader theoretical frame. 
As suggested by Maruna and Copes (2005) it makes little 
sense to construct an etiology of deviance or aggression on 
the sole basis of neutralization techniques (or, correspond-
ingly, moral neutralization).18 Because of its understanding 
of crime and violence as moral action and its focus on the 
most proximal mechanisms of crime/violence causation, 
Situational Action Theory (Wikström 2004; Wikström 
and Treiber 2009) offers a promising framework to inte-
grate the concept of moral neutralization. Wikström and 
Treiber posit that acts of crime and violence are the prod-
uct of an interaction between situational characteristics 
(temptations, provocations, moral context19) and individual 
decision making, viewing individual decision-making as 
largely determined by an individual’s morality and ability 
to exercise self-control. In a given situation of temptation 
or provocation with a given moral context, acts of violence 
are expected 1) when an individual has not internalized the 
moral rules relevant in the corresponding situation so that 
acting violently is viewed as a legitimate option or 2) when 
an individual is unable to exercise self-control when con-
fronted with temptation or provocation and hence unable to 
act in accordance with his or her moral beliefs.
Within this framework the concept of moral neutralization 
is useful for understanding another mechanism that facili-
tates violent or, more generally, immoral action. Specifically, 
we posit that an individual able to cognitively neutralize 
the incongruence between his or her moral beliefs and acts 
that conflict with those beliefs is also more likely to engage 
in immoral action. In other words, moral neutralization 
allows internalized moral rules to be temporarily discarded 
and makes them appear irrelevant in specific situations.20 It 
is expected that such a mechanism will substantially lower 
the psychological costs of violence and thus also lower the 
individual pressure to exercise self-control. This view is also 
18 Maruna and Copes (2005) suggest a theoretical in-
tegration that differs substantially from what we pro-
pose. In essence, they conceive neutralization tech-
niques/moral neutralization as post-transgression 
mechanisms that are important for understanding 
persistence of or desistance from criminal behavior. 
Although we agree on the relevance of such mecha-
nisms, we believe that moral neutralization is also 
important in the immediate pre-transgression phase. 
In line with Bandura, our starting point is that 
“people do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible 
conduct until they have justified to themselves the 
rightness of their actions” (Bandura et al. 1996, 365).
19 “A moral context is defined as the action-relevant 
moral rules that apply to a setting and their level of 
enforcement” (Wikström and Treiber 2009, 91).
20 With regard to neutralization techniques, 
Agnew (1994, 567–568) supplies valuable evi-
dence in support of this hypothesis.
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in line with the concept of Gibbs and colleagues (1995) that 
secondary self-serving cognitive distortions (or, more gen-
erally, moral neutralization) are “pre- or post-transgression 
rationalizations [that] reduce the stresses from the con-
sequences of the primary distortions” (Barriga and Gibbs 
1996, 334), where the notion of primary distortions shares 
much in common with Gottfredson and Hirschi’s concept 
of self-control (1990; see footnote 4). 
The strong correlations between moral neutralization and 
both self-control and favorable perception of the costs and 
benefits of offending supplies preliminary empirical support 
for our conception of the mechanisms linking self-control 
and moral neutralization in the causation of aggressive and 
otherwise antisocial behavior. However, further research 
is needed to conclusively elucidate the mechanisms con-
necting these three constructs in the immediate causation 
of violence and, more generally, immoral action. Further 
extensions of the theory should also encompass situational 
characteristics – or elements of the moral context – that are 
likely to trigger specific moral neutralizations (e.g., be-
ing with a group of friends is likely to trigger diffusion of 
responsibility).
5.2. Need for Conceptual Clarification
Our review of the different conceptualizations of moral 
neutralization shows that some authors fail to clearly dif-
ferentiate between processes of moral neutralization and bi-
ased social information processing. In particular, we found 
that hostile attribution of intent (e.g. Crick and Dodge 1994) 
was identified as a mechanism of blaming the other (Ban-
dura et al. 1996) or of assuming the worst (Barriga and Gibbs 
1996). Other authors have already stressed the fundamental 
difference between biased information processing and cog-
nitive processes related to aggression beliefs and aggression 
legitimation (Zelli et al. 1999). For that reason we dropped 
items likely to measure biased social perception rather than 
self-serving legitimations from our scale in the preselection 
procedure. Future research should better take into account 
such delimitation problems to increase the conceptual clar-
ity and, consequently, the discriminant validity of corre-
sponding measurements.21
5.3. Limitations and Future Directions for Research
The moral neutralization scale presented in this article suf-
fers from several limitations. First, unlike most other scales 
reviewed above, our moral neutralization scale focuses 
specifically on the neutralization of aggression and violence 
rather than on a broader range of antisocial and/or immoral 
behaviors, and its predictive scope is accordingly narrower 
than that of more general scales. Second, the findings are 
limited to a general population of preadolescents. Results 
from younger and older age groups and from high-risk 
populations are needed for a fuller assessment of the scale’s 
properties. Third, given the cross-sectional nature of our 
data, the direction of the relationship between moral neu-
tralization, aggression, and other proximal factors involved 
in the causation and perpetuation of aggression is not clear. 
From a theoretical point of view experimental and longitu-
dinal research aimed precisely at unraveling pre- and post-
transgression mechanisms involving moral neutralization 
would be highly desirable. 
Finally, our review of different scales in the field of moral 
neutralization showed that they were validated with samples 
of very different ages, in a range between 10 and 20 years. 
However, in most studies the age of the participants and their 
level of moral develop ment are not an issue. Hence, both the-
ory and research would likely benefit to focus on the emer-
gence and consequent develop ment of moral neutralization 
patterns in the life course22 and to link these patterns with 
other relevant developmental processes, such as moral devel-
opment, the emergence and consolidation of self-control and, 
of course, with trajectories of aggression and violence.
21 Similar conceptual blur is also likely in other 
domains such as the differentiation between lack 
of empathy and conscious denial of injury.
22 To our knowledge, only one study specifi-
cally focuses on the developmental precursors of 
moral disengagement (Hyde, Shaw, and Moilanen 
2010) while another analyzes trajectories of moral 
disengagement (Paciello et al. 2008). However, since 
in this study measurement of moral disengage-
ment started as late as age 14, the decisive stage of 
preadolescent development remains unexplored.
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